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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code § 78A-4-
l 03(2)G) based on the transfer of this appeal from the Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Issue No. 1: Did the trial court err in concluding that the parties reached a 
binding and enforceable contract when the written document executed at the 
mediation expressly provided that it was subject to the drafting of a mutually 
acceptable settlement agreement and a new agreement with a third party, and that 
the litigation was not to be dismissed until the execution of such final agreements? 
Standard of Review: "Generally, a trial court's summary enforcement of a 
settlement agreement 'will not be reversed on appeal unless it is shown that there 
was an abuse of discretion."' John Deere Co. v. A & H Equip., Inc., 876 P.2d 880, 
883 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (quoting Zions First Nat 'l Bank v. Barbara Jensen 
Interiors, Inc., 781 P.2d 478,479 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (additional internal citation 
and quotation omitted)). Nonetheless, the question in arriving at the decision to 
enforce a settlement agreement of whether there was a meeting of the minds or 
whether a contract exists between parties is a question of law reviewed for 
correctness. See id.; McKelvey v. Hamilton, 2009 UT App 126, <J[ 17, 211 P.3d 390 
(in considering trial court's ruling on motion to enforce settlement agreement, 
"[t]he existence of a contract is a question oflaw, to be reviewed for correctness"). 
1 
Preservation Below: The Knights preserved this issue in briefing and oral 
argument of Patterson's motion to enforce a settlement agreement [0362-70, 
0648-55, 0678-80.] 1 
I. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a dispute between plaintiff/appellee Charley Patterson ("Patterson") 
and defendants/appellants Jed and Alisha Knight (the "Knights") regarding the 
splitting of commissions received for the distribution of products of Nu-Skin 
Enterprises, Inc. ("Nu-Skin"). [0001-16.] Patterson filed this action alleging 
among other things that the Knights breached the joint venture agreement between 
~ the parties. [0001-16.] The Knights denied Patterson's claims and asserted 
various counterclaims. [0034-50.] 
II. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW 
After exchanging pleadings, the parties stipulated to stay the case and 
mediate their dispute. [0123-0141.] At the conclusion of a mediation, the parties 
executed a hand-written document, [Add. A at 0551], (the "Mediation 
Agreement") (attached as Addendum B) drafted by Patterson's counsel [0349]. 
Among other things, the Mediation Agreement called for a new agreement 
to-be-negotiated with a third party known as Spearhead, under which Spearhead 
1 Citations to the record below are indicated by page ( e.g., "[ 100]"). Citations to 
the "Relevant Facts" section of this brief are as follows: [Fact_]. 
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would cease paying solely Jed Knight, but instead split commissions from 
Spearhead 50-50 between the Knights and Patterson. [Add. B at <JI I.] 
Additionally, the Mediation Agreement was expressly subject to the drafting of a 
mutually acceptable settlement agreement between the parties, to include express 
terms of the Mediation Agreement and also a to-be-negotiated mutual non-
disparagement clause; a new agreement for Got Your Number, Inc. ("GYN"), a 
Florida company owned by the parties; and the new Spearhead agreement. [Add. 
B at <JI 8.] The filing of papers to dismiss the lawsuit with prejudice was expressly 
conditioned on the execution of the final settlement agreement that includes the to-
be-negotiated non-disparagement clause, the new GYN agreement, and the new 
Spearhead agreement. [Add. B. at CJl 9.] 
Following the mediation, Patterson's counsel transmitted to the Knights' 
counsel a proposed settlement agreement, a proposed new GYN agreement, and a 
proposed new Spearhead agreement. [0300.] The Knights rejected these three 
agreements. [0343.] 
Patterson filed a motion to lift the stay and enforce what he alleged to be a 
binding settlement in the form of the Mediation Agreement. [0167-259.] The 
Knights opposed the motion, claiming among other things that a mutually 
acceptable settlement agreement, new GYN agreement, and new Spearhead 
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agreement were essential terms and without these documents, there was no final 
agreement. [0361-417.] 
The trial court granted Patterson's motion and concluded that the Mediation 
c.rj Agreement, standing alone, contained all of the material terms of a final settlement. 
[Add. A at 0550-558.] [The trial court's order is attached as Addendum A.] 
III. RELEVANT FACTS 
The Relationship Between the Parties 
1. In 2004, Jed Knight, Patterson, and Ryan Fry ("Fry")-all Nu-Skin 
distributors----entered into a joint venture agreement under which they agreed to 
share equally all amounts they received from their respective Nu-Skin 
~ distributorships. [0391.]2 
2. Patterson and Jed Knight bought out Fry's interest in the joint venture 
agreement. Subsequently, Patterson, Jed Knight, and Alisha Knight entered into a 
supplemental agreement under which Alisha Knight would also receive a portion 
of the income. [0391.] 
2 The record does not contain copies of the original agreements referenced in 
~ Fact 1 to 4, but these agreements are addressed in the recitals of agreements 
proposed by Patterson following the mediation, and the record citations are to these 
references. 
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3. In addition to their joint venture under the joint venture agreement and 
supplemental agreement, Patterson and the Knights are each shareholders of a 
separate business, GYN. [0391.] 
4. Since 2003, Jed Knight has earned additional compensation through 
Spearhead, a Utah general partnership. [0376-77, 0391.] 
5. Patterson filed this action asserting that Jed Knight was obligated to 
share with Patterson the income Jed Knight was receiving under his agreement 
with Spearhead. [Add. A at 0550.] 
The Mediation Agreement 
6. At the conclusion of a mediation, the parties executed the hand-
written Mediation Agreement. [Add. A at 0551.] 
7. Paragraph 1 of the Mediation Agreement indicates that commissions 
received from Spearhead-a nonparty to the litigation and the mediation [0405 at en 
9]-would be split 50-50 going forward, and that this would involve a new 
agreement with Spearhead to replace the existing agreement that obligates 
Spearhead to pay only the Knights: 
[Add.Bat <JI 1.] 
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8. Paragraph 8 makes the Mediation Agreement subject to the drafting of 
a mutually acceptable settlement agreement containing the terms of the Mediation 
Agreement and a non-disparagement clause; a new agreement for GYN; and the 
new Spearhead agreement: 
[Add. B at <J( 8.] 
9. Paragraph 9 of the Mediation Agreement makes dismissal of the 
lawsuit contingent on the execution of these additional agreements. 
Events Following the Mediation 
10. A few days following the mediation, Patterson's counsel sent to the 
4i Knights' counsel drafts of a final settlement agreement, a new GYN agreement, 
and a new Spearhead agreement. [0300.] 
11. Counsel for Patterson sent a follow-up email inquiring about the status 
of the draft agreements. Counsel for the Knights responded the same day, "[T]he 
6 
docs are in the hands of our clients and we are awaiting their input. [W]e will put a 
'bug in their ear' to get with it." [0341.] ~ 
12. A few days later, Patterson's counsel sent another email to the 
Knights' counsel, who replied that that terms of the draft final settlement 
agreement, new GYN agreement, and new Spearhead agreement were 
unacceptable. [0343.] 
13. Patterson's counsel responded with his belief that the Mediation 
Agreement "is legally binding," [0345], and proceeded to ask the trial court to 
require the Knights to execute Patterson's draft agreements. [0268-71.] 
14. The trial court granted Patterson's motion, concluding that the 
Mediation Agreement was a binding, enforceable, final settlement, but that the 
draft final settlement agreement, new GYN agreement, and new Spearhead 
agreement went beyond the materials terms of the Mediation Agreement and were 
therefore not enforceable. [Add. A at 0550-58.] 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Court should reverse the trial court's ruling that the Mediation 
Agreement is a final, enforceable settlement agreement between the parties. The 
Mediation Agreement expressly provides that it is subject to the future drafting and 
agreement by the parties to further written contracts, including a mutually 
acceptable final settlement agreement containing the terms of the Mediation 
7 
Agreement and a non-disparagement clause and new GYN and Spearhead 
agreements; and that dismissal of the litigation is contingent on the execution of 
such agreements. Where these subsequent, final written contracts were never 
r.#J agreed upon or executed, essential terms of a final settlement are lacking and the 
trial court erred in concluding otherwise. 
I. 
ARGUMENT 
THE MEDIATION AGREEMENT IS NOT A FINAL, 
ENFORCEABLE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT THAT RESOLVED 
THE LITIGATION. 
As a matter of law, the trial court erred when it concluded that the Mediation 
Agreement was a final, enforceable settlement agreement containing all of the 
~ material and essential terms of agreement between the parties necessary to 
manifest a meeting of the minds and sufficient to end conclusively the litigation 
between the parties. The express language of the Mediation Agreement makes any 
final settlement "subject to" the future drafting of a mutually acceptable final 
settlement agreement containing the terms of the Mediation Agreement and a non-
disparagement clause and new GYN and Spearhead agreements. And dismissal of 
the lawsuit is not to occur until execution of those final agreements. Under these 
circumstances, essential, material terms of a final settlement are lacking as a matter 
of law, and the trial court's conclusion to the contrary was incorrect. 
8 
A. Whether a Final Settlement Occurred Is Based on Utah 
Standards Regarding Contract Definiteness and Finality 
While "[g]enerally, the trial court's summary enforcement of a settlement 
agreement 'will not be reversed on appeal unless it is shown that there was an 
abuse of discretion,"' the questions "[i]in arriving at its decision to enforce the 
settlement agreement" of whether the parties "had a meeting of the minds" or 
"whether a contract exists between parties is a question of law ... reviewed for 
correctness." John Deere Co., 876 P.2d at 883 (quoting Zions First Nat 'l Bank, 
781 P.2d at 479 (additional internal citation and quotation omitted)); see also 
McKelvey, 2009 UT App 126 at ,I 17 (in considering trial court's ruling on motion 
to enforce settlement agreement, "[ t ]he existence of a contract is a question of law, 
to be reviewed for correctness"). 
Under Utah law, "[s]ettlement agreements are governed by the rules applied 
to general contract actions." Sackler v. Savin, 897 P.2d 1217, 1220 (Utah 1995). 
Principally in focus in this case are the standards from this Court and the Supreme 
Court regarding definiteness and finality of contracts generally and settlement 
agreements specifically. 
It is well settled that "[a] condition precedent to the enforcement of any 
contract is that there must be a meeting of the minds of the parties, which must be 
spelled out, either expressly or impliedly, with sufficient definiteness to be 
9 
enforced." Valcarce v. Bitters, 12 Utah 2d 61, 362 P.2d 427,428 (1961).3 "[T]he 
terms of the agreement must be reasonably certain so parties know what is required 
of them, and definite enough that the courts can delineate the intent of the 
~ contracting parties." Reed v. Alvey, 610 P.2d 1374, 1377 (Utah 1980). 
Under Utah law, '"[t]he terms of a contract are reasonably certain if they 
provide a basis for determining the existence of a breach and for giving an 
appropriate remedy."' Cea v. Hoffman, 2012 UT App 101, <J[ 24, 276 P.3d 1178 
(citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts§ 33(2)). In other words, a binding 
contract does not exist unless "the terms are sufficiently definite as to be capable of 
being enforced." LD III, LLC v. BBRD, LC, 2009 UT App 301, <J[ 14,221 P.3d 
867. 
Moreover, '""[i]f an intention is manifested in any way that legal obligations 
(.j between the parties shall be deferred until the writing is made, the preliminary 
negotiations and agreements do not constitute a contract."'" 1-800 Contacts, Inc. 
v. Weigner, 2005 UT App 523, <JI 7, 127 P.3d 1241 (quoting R.J. Daum Constr. Co. 
3 See also Bunnell v. Bills, 13 Utah 2d 83, 368 P.2d 597,600 (1962) ("A binding 
contract can exist only where there has been mutual assent by the parties 
manifesting their intention to be bound by its terms. Furthermore, a contract can 
be enforced by the courts only if the obligations of the parties are set forth with 
sufficient definiteness that it can be performed; Cessna Fin. Corp. v. Meyer, 575 
P.2d 1048, 1050 (Utah 1978) ("[C]ontractual mutual assent requires assent by all 
parties to the same thing in the same sense so that their minds meet as to all the 
terms."). 
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v. Child, 122 Utah 194,247 P.2d 817,820 (1952) (quoting Restatement of 
Contracts § 25 cmt. a)).4 Stated differently, '"[s]o long as there is any uncertainty 
or indefiniteness, or future negotiations or considerations to be had between the 
parties, there is not a completed contract. In fact, there is no contract at all."' 
Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler v. Young, 2004 UT 26, 'I[ 17, 94 P.3d 179 (quoting 
Candland v. Oldroyd, 67 Utah 605, 248 P. 1101, 1102 (1926)) (holding that broad, 
indefinite statements about compensation did not create a contract between law 
firm and attorney with regard to compensation). 
A contract that "leave[ s] open material terms for future consideration" is 
referred to as an "agreement to agree" and is "generally unenforceable." Harmon 
v. Greenwood, 596 P.2d 636, 639 (Utah 1979). An agreement to agree can only be 
4 The trial court correctly indicated that a "settlement agreement, like any other 
contract, is enforceable even when the parties expect to put the terms in a more 
formal document." [Add. A at 0553 (gathering cases).] However, the case law 
relied on by the trial court for this proposition has limited application here. See 
Lawrence Const. Co. v. Holmquist, 642 P.2d 382, 383 (Utah 1982) (finding 
existence of binding settlement agreement because documents constituting 
agreement did not "specifically state[] that the settlement was contingent on" 
conditions argued by contesting party); Zions First Nat'/. Bank, 781 P.2d at 480 
(finding existence of binding settlement agreement based on oral agreement 
entered into during settlement negotiations; however, challenging party did not 
challenge any terms of oral agreement); Miller v. Basic Research, LLC, No. 2:07-
cv-871 TS, 2013 WL 1194721, at *6 (D. Utah Mar. 22, 2013) (finding existence of 
binding settlement agreement from term sheet signed by parties after mediation; 
however, party opposing agreement did not present any evidence that any material 
terms required further negotiation and, in fact, informed court that settlement had 
been reached and was successful). 
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enforced if it '''include[ s] sufficiently definite terms and conditions,' regarding the 
'essential terms of the contract."' GeoNan Properties, LLC v. Park-Ro-She, Inc., 
2011 UT App 309, <J[ 10,263 P.3d 1169 (quoting Brown's Shoe Fit Co. v. Olch, 
~ 955 P.2d 357, 363 (Utah Ct. App. 1998); C & Y Corp. v. General Biometrics, Inc., 
896 P.2d 47, 52 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)).5 "Whether or not [a term is] essential to 
the contract requires an examination of the entire agreement and the circumstances 
under which the agreement was entered into." Cessna Fin. Corp., 575 P.2d at 
1050.6 
B. There Could Be No Final Settlement Without Execution of 
Further Written Agreements, Which Never Occurred. 
The Mediation Agreement was not a final settlement agreement. Any 
settlement was subject to the negotiation and execution of further agreements, 
which never happened. Without the essential material terms required by 
paragraphs 1, 8, and 9, the Mediation Agreement is unenforceable as a stand-alone 
settlement agreement. 
5 See also King v. Nevada Elec. Inv. Co., 893 F. Supp. 1006, 1016 (D. Utah 
1994) ("Although it is not necessary that the contract provide for every collateral 
matter or possible contingency, the parties themselves must have set forth with 
sufficient definiteness at least the essentials terms of the contract.") ( citing D.H. 
Overmyer Co. v. Brown, 439 F.2d 926, 930 (10th Cir. 1971)). 
6 See also Crismon v. Western Co. of North America, 742 P.2d 1219, 1221-22 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987) ("Determining whether the specific terms omitted were 
essential to the agreement requires an examination of the entire agreement and the 
circumstances under which the agreement was entered into.") ( citing Cessna Fin. 
Corp., 575 P.2d at 1050). 
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1. The Spearhead Agreement Is an Essential, Missing Term of 
a Final Settlement Between the Parties. 
The requirement in paragraphs 1, 8, and 9 of the Mediation Agreement that a 
new agreement be put in place with third-party Spearhead is an essential settlement 
term without which there could be no settlement nor dismissal of the lawsuit. 
Paragraph 1 specifies that it was to be in and through that new Spearhead 
agreement that Spearhead itself was to split commissions 50-50 between the 
parties. [Fact 7 .] Paragraph 8 expressly makes the Mediation Agreement 
"[s]ubject to" the drafting of the new Spearhead agreement. [Fact 8.] And 
paragraph 9 provides that no dismissal paperwork is to be filed until execution of 
the new Spearhead agreement. [Fact 9.] Had the new Spearhead agreement not 
been an essential, material settlement term, it would not have been required in 
paragraphs, 1, 8, and 9 of the Mediation Agreement and Patterson would not have 
transmitted a proposed new Spearhead agreement following the mediation. 
Based on the express provisions in the Mediation Agreement regarding the 
Spearhead agreement, it was error for the trial court to "conclude[] that the 
material term at issue is that the parties are going to split the proceeds 50/50 going 
forward," and that "whether those proceeds came directly from Spearhead through 
an amended agreement or from Defendants is not the material issue." [ Add. A at 
553 n.3.] There is nothing in the Mediation Agreement itself to suggest that 
13 
Patterson merely wanted-whatever the source-a 50-50 split of commissions 
arising from the original agreement between Spearhead and Jed Knight. 
Instead, paragraph 1 expressly calls for a new Spearhead agreement through 
~ which commissions will be directed 50-50 between the parties, and this was so 
important that paragraph 8 makes the Mediation Agreement "subject to" the 
drafting of the new Spearhead agreement, and paragraph 9 requires the new 
Spearhead agreement to be executed before dismissal paperwork would be filed. 
[Facts 7-9.] The trial court could not write these essential terms out of the 
Mediation Agreement. 7 
2. The Terms of the Spearhead Agreement Are Missing and 
Preclude Enforcement of the Mediation Agreement as the 
Final Settlement Agreement. 
While the negotiation and execution of a new Spearhead agreement is an 
~ essential term without which there could be no settlement, any final settlement 
agreement is lacking in definiteness because the new Spearhead agreement remains 
7 Even if the Court were to construe the trial court's legal conclusion in footnote 
3 of the Order (that "the material term at issue is that the parties are going to split 
the proceeds 50/50 going forward-whether those proceeds came directly from 
Spearhead through an amended agreement or from Defendants") as a factual 
finding requiring evidence marshaling, which is not the case because it is a 
conclusion of law, Patterson presented no evidence whatsoever outside of the four 
comers of the Mediation Agreement from which the Court could have made such a 
finding. Patterson's two declarations are silent on the issue [0347-50, 0447-51], 
and acknowledge his view of the importance of a new Spearhead agreement, which 
he obtained and supplied to the Knights' counsel following the mediation. [0349-
50 at <J[ 15.] 
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subject to future negotiation among Patterson, the Knights, and Spearhead-a third 
party [Fact 7]. As the Supreme Court held in Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler, '"[s]o 
long as there is any uncertainty or indefiniteness, or future negotiations or 
considerations to be had between the parties, there is not a completed contract. In 
fact, there is no contract at all."' 2004 UT 26 at <JI 17 ( quoting Candland, 248 P. at 
1102 (1926)).8 
The problem here is not merely the uncertainty and indefiniteness of future 
negotiations between the parties of a new Spearhead agreement, but also the 
uncertainty of negotiating with Spearhead, a third party. In its quick analysis that 
what remained after the Mediation Agreement was simply the "formalizing" of 
what is in the Mediation Agreement [Add. A at 553], the trial court ignored the 
8 See also the other authorities cited in Point l(A), above. See also lnterway, 
Inc. v. Alagna, 407 N .E.2d 615, 619 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (The words "subject to" 
"when used in connection with contracts ... usually indicate a condition on a 
party's duty of performance and suggest that mere negotiation is contemplated by 
the parties."); Ocean Atl. Dev. Corp. v. Aurora Christian Sch., Inc., 322 F.3d 983, 
995-96 (7th Cir. 2003) ("[A] letter of intent or similar preliminary writing that 
reflects a tentative agreement contingent upon successful completion of 
negotiations that are ongoing, does not amount to a contract that binds the 
parties."); Evergreen Investments, LLC v. FCL Graphics, Inc., 334 F.3d 750, 754-
57 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding that letter of intent did not constitute binding 
agreement because it "was 'subject to' several factors and conditions including ... 
negotiation and execution of definitive legal documentations ... as well as 'certain 
legal, regulatory and other necessary third party approvals"'); Sears, Roebuck & 
Co. v. AIG Annuity Ins. Co., 270 S.W.3d 632, 635 (Tex. Ct. App. 2008) ("The 
words 'subject to' are unambiguous and indicate a condition when used in a 
contract."). 
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reality of having to put in place a new Spearhead agreement among Patterson, the 
Knights, and Spearhead. This was error. 
As illustrated by the new proposed Spearhead agreement transmitted after 
the mediation, the task at hand was not as simple as formalizing the single term of 
the new Spearhead agreement referenced in the Mediation Agreement. To the 
contrary, the proposed new Spearhead agreement is 14 pages long, involves unique 
contractual terms specific to entities in a multi-level marketing company, and 
contains language not found in the original Spearhead agreement or the Mediation 
Agreement. [0221-34.] Where the original Spearhead agreement only involved 
Jed Knight and Spearhead [0221-22], the new proposed agreement adds as parties 
Alisha Knight, GYN, and Patterson [0221]. The new agreement would obligate 
Alisha Knight, for example, to nondisclosure, noncompetition, and non-solicitation 
(j covenants and other terms to which she was not subject before. [0226-29.] 
The trial court correctly refused to enforce Patterson's proposed new 
Spearhead agreement, concluding that it "go[ es] beyond the material terms of the 
Agreement executed by the parties at the mediation and there is no evidence that 
Defendants agreed to the additional terms." [Add. A at 0557.] However, the trial 
court failed to go on to explain what the Mediation Agreement could possibly 
mean when it states that it is subject to the negotiation of a new Spearhead 
agreement and that dismissal of the case was conditioned on execution of the new 
16 
Spearhead agreement. Questions remain as to what the new Spearhead agreement 
will need to say and what is to happen if the parties and Spearhead are unable to 
reach an agreement. As a matter of Utah law, these uncertainties preclude 
enforcement of the Mediation Agreement as the final settlement between the 
parties. 
3. A MutuallvAcceptable Settlement Agreement with a Non-
disparagement Provision ls an Essential. Missing Term of 
Final Settlement 
For similar reasons as the new Spearhead agreement, it was an essential term 
of final settlement that a "mutually acceptable settlement agreement" containing 
the terms of the Mediation Agreement and a non-disparagement clause be executed 
and that dismissal papers were not to be filed until the mutually acceptable 
settlement agreement was executed. [Facts 8-9.] While the settlement agreement 
was to include the provisions contained in the Mediation Agreement, paragraph 8 
also makes an essential part of settlement a mutual non-disparagement clause, but 
fails to specify the parameters of this clause. 
Courts in Utah find contract terms "essential" by examining "the entire 
agreement and the circumstances under which the agreement was entered into," 
Cessna Fin. Corp., 57 5 P.2d at I 050,9 including essential terms of settlement 
9 See, e.g., Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Call, 712 P.2d 231,236 (Utah 1985) 
(recognizing exclusionary terms as essential terms of insurance contract); Davies v. 
Olson, 746 P.2d 264, 267 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (recognizing price as essential term 
17 
agreements. 10 While no Utah court has addressed whether a non-disparagement 
clause is an essential term of a settlement agreement, the Seventh Circuit addressed 
this issue in Higbee v. Sentry Insurance Co., 253 F.3d 994 (7th Cir. 2001), where 
~ parties in an employment case agreed in principle after a mediation to certain 
terms, such as including a non-disparagement clause. Id. at 996. There, the non-
disparagement clause was an essential settlement term because the employee 
"made it clear that she would not settle the case without such a clause." Id. at 
998. This case is no different because the non-disparagement clause is specifically 
identified in the Mediation Agreement as one of the terms to which settlement 
would be subject. [Fact 8.] 
While the non-disparagement clause is an essential term of the Mediation 
Agreement, the specific details of the clause are not sufficiently definite and 
:s certain. The same was true in Higbee, where the Seventh Circuit reversed a trial 
court's finding of a binding settlement agreement because an essential non-
of construction contract); Brown's Shoe Fit Co., 955 P.2d at 364 ("The initial 
period included all the essential elements of a lease: the identity of the Property, 
the agreed term, and the rental amount."); Cal Wadsworth Constr. v. St. George 
City, 898 P.2d 1372, 1376-77 (Utah 1995) (recognizing price and quantity of 
construction were material terms in construction contract). 
10 See, e.g., Blackhurst v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 699 P.2d 688, 692 (Utah 1985) 
(finding that note in letter confirming settlement agreement regarding appointment 
of guardian was not condition to completion of settlement agreement); Sackler, 
897 P.2d at 1222 (finding that parties did not proceed beyond preliminary 
negotiations of settlement agreement because they did not reach meeting of minds 
on essential term-full rental rate of property that parties were going to rent out). 
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disparagement clause was not sufficiently definite. See 253 F.3d at 998. This was 
because "the parties agreed on little more than the fact that the settlement 
agreement would contain ... a nondisparagement clause, and further negotiation 
was necessary to come to a specific agreement." Id. 
Like the draft settlement agreement in Higbee, the non-disparagement clause 
is not spelled out with any specificity in the Mediation Agreement, rendering the 
Mediation Agreement, standing alone, as not sufficiently certain and definite. 
There is no way from the mere statement that the final settlement agreement is to 
include "mutual non-disparagement" to find "a basis for determining the existence 
of a breach and for giving an appropriate remedy." Cea, 2012 UT App 101 at CJ[ 24 
(citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts§ 33(2)). Indeed, the terms of the non-
disparagement clause are not "reasonably certain so the parties know what is 
required of them, and definite enough that the courts can delineate the intent of the 
contracting parties." Reed, 610 P.2d at 1377. Instead, the parties are ignorant to 
exactly what they can and cannot do or say. On this ground, it was error to 
conclude that the Mediation Agreement, standing alone, was a final settlement 
agreement. 
4. The GYN Agreement ls an Essential, Missing Term of a 
Final Settlement Between the Parties. 
Finally, on similar grounds as the new Spearhead agreement and a mutually 
acceptable settlement agreement, the negotiation, creation, and execution of a new 
19 
"GYN agreement" was an essential term of any final settlement, as specified in 
paragraph 8 and 9 of the Mediation Agreement. [Facts 8-9.] The fact that the 
parties never agreed to a new GYN agreement precludes enforcement of the 
41 Mediation Agreement as the final settlement between the parties. On this ground 
and the others identified above, the district court erred in concluding that the 
Mediation Agreement is a binding, enforceable settlement between the parties. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the Knights respectfully request that the Court 
reverse the trial court's legal conclusion that the Mediation Agreement-standing 
alone--was a binding and enforceable settlement agreement, and in turn reverse 
~ the Court's ruling dismissing this action with prejudice, and remand the case for 
further proceedings. 
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ADDENDUM A 
THll'fD ll'ltllD n,.~T~,"' .. ,.. SEP 1 7, iois , ,ou,,1 
WEST JORDAN DEPT 
TIDRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STA TE OF UTAH 
WEST JORDAN DEPARTMENT 
CHARLEY PATTERSON, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JED KNIGHT, an individual, and ALISHA 
KNIGHT, an individual, 
Defendants. 
ORDER 
Case No. 140906572 
Judge James D. Gardner 
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion to Lift Stipulated Stay and to 
Enforce Settlement (Motion).1 The parties briefed the Motion and the Court held a hearing on 
July 7, 2015. The parties filed supplemental briefing on August 11, 2015. Having carefully 
~ reviewed the record and considering the arguments of counsel, the Court now issues the 
following Order. 
By way of background, this dispute centers around a joint venture agreement between the 
parties whereby they agreed to combine their Nu Skin distributorships and share equally 
(Plaintiff 50% and Defendants 50%) all amounts they received with respect to the distribution of 
Nu Skin products. In or around September 2014, Plaintiff sued Defendants based on Plaintiff's 
claim that Plaintiff was entitled to a portion of the commissions Defendants had been receiving 
related to the distribution of the Nu Skin products from a company called Spearhead, Inc. 
1 Defendants do not contest Plaintiff's request to lift the stay. 
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(Spearhead). In January 2015, the parties jointly moved to stay this action to attend early 
mediation. On February 4, 2015, the parties attended mediation with retired Judge Frank G. 
Noel. At the conclusion of the mediation, the parties signed a hand-written agreement 
(Agreement). There is no dispute that the Agreement was signed by all the parties. The 
Agreement contains nine provisions, including key provisions that the parties would split the 
Spearhead commissions 50/50 going forward and that Defendants would pay Plaintiff $125,000 
for past commissions. The Agreement specified payment terms and other material details, 
including a provision contemplating the drafting of a more formal "mutually acceptable 
settlement agreement," as well as a new joint venture agreement and a new agreement with 
Spearhead to reflect the issues set forth in the Agreement. Following the mediation, on or about 
February 12, 2015, Plaintiff's counsel transmitted to Defendants' counsel a draft of a more 
fonnal settlement agreement, as contemplated by the Agreement. On or about February 18, 2015, 
Plaintiff's counsel sent Defendants' counsel a follow-up email asking for a status on the review 
of the documents. Defendants' counsel responded: ''the docs are in the hands of our clients and 
we are awaiting their input. [W]e will put a 'bug in their ear' to get with it." On March 2, 2015, 
Plaintiff's counsel sent another follow-up email, and this time Defendants' counsel responded 
that they would not be signing the formal agreements and that they were ''terminating the 
mediation proposed agreement." Plaintiff's counsel responded that same day indicating their 
belief that the Agreement "reached by the parties during mediation is legally binding." 
Plaintiff argues in his Motion that not only is the Agreement signed at mediation binding, 
but that this Court should enforce the more formal agreements circulated on February 12, 2015. 
Defendants argue that the Agreement signed at mediation is not enforceable because (1) it is only 
2 
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~ an agreement-to-agree, (2) it lacks definite material terms, and (3) the parties intended that the 
settlement agreement was not a final expression of their settlement or that Mr. Knight lacked the 
mental capacity to sign the Agreement. The Court concludes that the Agreement is an 
enforceable and binding agreement that should be enforced. 
Utah law favors voluntary settlement of legal disputes. Tracy-Collins Bank & Trust Co. v. 
~ Travelstead, 592 P.2d 605, 607 (Utah 1979) ("Settlements are favored in the law, and should be 
encouraged, because of the obvious benefits accruing not only to the parties, but also to the 
judicial system."). Utah courts have recognized that settlement agreements should be enforced 
when the "record establishes a binding agreement and the excuse for nonperfonnance is 
comparatively unsubstantial." Zions First Nat. Bank v. Barbara Jensen Interiors, Inc., 781 P.2d 
478, 479 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). "The basic rules of contract formation are used to detennine 
whether two parties have entered into an enforceable settlement agreement." McKelvey v. 
Hamilton, 2009 UT App. 126,128, 211 P.3d 390 (citing Goodmansen v. Liberty Vending Sys., 
Inc., 866 P.2d 581, 584-85 (Utah Ct.App.1993). "Contract formation requires two necessary 
elements: offer and acceptance." McKelvey, 2009 UT App. 126, ,I 28 (citing 1-800 Contacts, Inc. 
v. Weigner, 2005 UT App 523, ,I 2, 127 P.3d 1241).2 Both of those elements are met in this case. 
At the conclusion of a lengthy mediation, the parties reached a meeting of the minds on the 
2 
"An offer is a manifestation of willingness to enter into an agreement, inviting another to accept An 
acceptance is a manifestation of assent to an offer, such that an objective, reasonable person is justified in 
understanding that a fully enforceable contract has been made. An acceptance must unconditionally assent 
to all material tenns presented in the offer ... or it is a rejection .... " McKelvey, 2009 UT App. 126, ,I 28 
(internal citations and quotations omitted). 
3 
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essential terms of an agreement, it was put into writing, reviewed by the parties and their 
counsel, and it was signed. 
Although Defendants do not dispute that they negotiated and signed the Agreement, they 
do dispute that it was a final settlement. First, Defendants argue that the Agreement is only an 
agreement-to-agreement because it "requires future agreements and future negotiations." (Def. 
Opp. Memo. 4.) Specifically, Defendants point out that the Agreement states as follows: 
"Subject to Drafting mutually acceptable Settlement Agreement [with the] above provisions and 
mutual non-disparagement, and new GYN & Spearhead Agreements." This provision, however, 
does not contemplate further negotiations over material terms, but instead contemplates (1) that 
the parties will take the handwritten Agreement and formalize it in a written format; and (2) 
parties will amend existing agreements to include the provisions set forth in the Agreement. 3 In 
other words, the material terms are set forth in the Agreement and formalizing them in a written 
document and/or amending other existing documents to include the provisions of the Agreement 
does not make the Agreement an agreement-to-agree. Utah law provides that a settlement 
agreement, like any other contract, is enforceable even when the parties expect to put the terms 
in a more formal document. See Lawrence Const. Co. v. Holmquist, 642 P.2d 382, 384 (Utah 
1982), Zions First Nat. Bank v. Barbara Jensen Interiors, Inc., 781 P .2d 4 78, 480 (Utah Ct. App. 
3 Defendants argue that the Agreement is contingent on an agreement with a third-party, Spearhead, and 
therefore cannot be enforceable. Plaintiff argues that the parties anticipated that the Spearhead agreement 
would be amended to include the new division of the proceeds. Furthermore, Plaintiff claims that 
Spearhead actually agreed to the amendment after the mediation. Regardless, the Court concludes that the 
material term at issue is that the parties are going to split the proceeds 50/50 going forward-whether 
those proceeds came directly from Spearhead through an amended agreement or from Defendants is not 
the material issue. 
4 
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~ 1989); Miller v. Basic Research, LLC, No. 2:07-CV-871 TS, 2013 WL 1194721, at *2 (D. Utah 
Mar. 22, 2013) appeal dismissed, 750 F.3d 1173 (10th Cir. 2014). In fact, this is common place 
in settlements that talce place at mediation. 
Defendants next argue that the Agreement is not binding because it lacks definite 
material tenns to show a meeting of the minds. The Court also rejects this argument. Although 
~ the Agreement is handwritten and the parties did anticipate a more formal written agreement 
adopting the agreed upon material tenns, the Agreement does set forth the essential tenns of the 
parties' agreement and current intent to settle the lawsuit. It sets forth the amounts Defendants 
would pay to Plaintiff to resolve his claims and the manner in which such amounts would be 
paid. It provides that Spearhead commissions would be split between Plaintiff and the 
Defendants with a 50/50 split beginning with the January 2015 commissions,4 and made clear 
that commissions received from current Got Your Number, Inc. downlines would also be split 
50/50. It sets out the parties' responsibilities with respect to maintaining their downlines and the 
consequences if they are not maintained. Further, it specifies how business expenses would be 
handled going forward It also provides for the drafting and execution of a more fonnal 
settlement document and the dismissal of the underlying lawsuit with prejudice. When the parties 
left mediation on February 4, 2015, they had agreed to the material terms of a settlement 
agreement and the terms are sufficiently definite to be enforced. 
4 Defendants argue that there is nothing in the Agreement as to how the Defendants would split their 50% 
share of the commissions. This, however, is between the Defendants and does not preclude the Plaintiff 




Next, Defendants contend that Mr. Knight was told by the other parties that it was not a 
final agreement at the mediation and that he lacked capacity to sign the Agreement because he 
was ill and it was a long mediation. Specifically, in a declaration filed with the Court, Mr. Knight 
claims that Plaintiff and co-defendant Ms. Knight told him the Agreement was not binding, but 
rather "merely a starting point for negotiations." (Deel. of Jed Knight, ,nf 13 - 17.) In addition, 
Mr. Knight's declaration also states that he was sick and he "did not have the presence of mind, 
emotionally or physically, to understand what the written proposal contained." (Id 1 17.) The 
Court rejects these arguments. 
The Utah Uniform Mediation Act (Act) expressly provides that unless waived or 
precluded, "a mediation communication is privileged . . . and is not subject to discovery or 
admissible in evidence." Utah Code § 78B-10-104(1).5 An exception to this general rule is that 
the privilege is not applicable to "an agreement evidenced by a record signed by all parties to the 
agreement." Id at 106(l)(a). In trying to portray the Agreement as unenforceable or an 
agreement-to-agree, the Defendants have submitted declarations that contain the very type of 
statements that would be privileged under the Act. While the Defendants seek to invoke a narrow 
exception under the Act under Utah Code § 78B-10-106(2), the Court concludes that exception 
does not apply in this matter as the proposed evidence does not substantially outweigh the 
interest in protecting the confidentiality because the proposed evidence is not credible or does 
not raise substantial doubt whether a binding agreement was entered into at the mediation. Even 
if the Court were to find the exception to the Act applied and considered the Defendants' 
5 The Act defines "mediation communication" as "conduct or a statement, whether oral, in a record, 
verbal, or nonverbal, that occurs during mediation ... " Utah Code § 78B-l 0-102(2). 
6 
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l4J declarations, the Court would still conclude that the Agreement is binding. Tellingly, no 
statements about the Agreement being "not binding" or a "starting point" are included in the 
Agreement itself. Furthermore, the parties were represented by able and competent counsel at the 
mediation and, yet, the Agreement contains no mention of it not being binding. The language of 
the Agreement combined with the representation by all parties of sophisticated counsel undercuts 
~ Defendants' argument that the parties intended the Agreement to be a "starting point. "6 Thus, 
regardless of the whether the privilege under the Act precludes the Court from considering the 
Defendants' declarations or if the Court does consider the Defendants' declarations, the result is 
the same: the Court concludes that the Agreement is binding. 
As to Mr. Knight's post-mediation claim that he lacked the requisite mental capacity to 
~ sign the Agreement, Mr. Knight has failed to meet his burden to support his argument. Under 
Utah law, the party claiming incapacity to contract must show that his "mental facilities [were] 
so deficient or impaired that there was not sufficient power to comprehend the subject of the 
contract, its nature and its probable consequences, and to act with discretion in relation thereto, 
or with relation to the ordinary affairs of life." Walker v. U.S. Gen., Inc., 916 P .2d 903, 907 
(Utah 1996) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Mr. Knight's statements that he lacked 
6 
"The conduct of both parties may also be considered in determining whether they entered into an 
agreement." McKelvey, 2009 UT App 126,128,211 P.3d 390. In this case, signing the written 
Agreement that contains no language that it was a "starting point" or "not binding" evidences the 
Defendants' intent. Conduct by the Plaintiff's lawyer and the Defendants' lawyer after the mediation also 
supports that parties had entered into a binding agreement. After the mediation concluded, Plaintiff's 
counsel sent Defendants' counsel a draft of the formal agreements, communicated about the proposed 
formal agreements in a couple of separate emails, and not until a couple weeks later did Defendants' 
counsel raise any objection. At no point in the initial communications did either party act as if they had 
not settled this matter at the mediation. 
7 
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capacity do not meet this standard, particularly where he was represented by counsel and where 
an independent mediator was involved. 
Finally, while the Court finds the Agreement to be enforceable, the Court does not go as 
far as Plaintiff requests and the Court will not summarily enforce the more formal agreements 
circulated on February 12, 2015. While the Agreement does contemplate a more formal 
settlement agreement, the formal agreements circulated by Plaintiff on February 12, 2015 go 
beyond the material terms of the Agreement executed by the parties at the mediation and there is 
no evidence that Defendants agreed to the additional terms. The Court rules only that the 
Agreement is enforceable and operates to settle the pending litigation. To the extent the parties 
would like to include other terms in the more formal agreement, they are certainly free to do so 
provided that they agree on the additional terms. 
Based on the foregoing, the Motion to Lift Stipulated Stay and to Enforce Settlement is 
GRANTED. The Court lifts the stay imposed in this case, detennines that the Agreement is 
enforceable and dismisses this matter with prejudice. This is the final order of the Court and no 
further order is necessary. 
DATED this may of September, 2015. 
BY THE COURT: 
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